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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff1/Appellant Janice K. Freer (hereinafter "Janice") advanced funds to 
Defendant/Respondent Cody Freer (hereinafter "Cody") so he could, among other things, 
purchase a vehicle and insurance which would assist Cody to secure employment. Janice 
maintains the parties had an oral agreement that Cody would repay her the money. Cody claims 
that Janice intended to gift him the funds at issue. 
B. Proceedings 
After trial to the bench, the District Court, the Honorable Barbara Buchanan presiding, 
found that Janice had intended to make a gift to Cody. The District Court also found that if the 
parties did have an oral agreement that Cody would pay Janice back, the oral agreement was 
unenforceable based on the statute of frauds. 
C. Facts 
Janice is Cody's aunt. (Tr.8, Ln.4) Janice heard that Cody was incarcerated in Orofino, 
Idaho, and she started visiting him once a month starting in the fall of 2010. (Tr.8, Ln. 12) 
During these visits, Janice discussed with Cody lending him money upon his release to purchase 
a vehicle so he could obtain employment. (Tr.8, Ln. 24 - 9, Ln.6) Janice understood the 
agreement to be that Cody would make some kind of payment and maintain insurance on the 
vehicle or the vehicle would be returned. (Id) Shortly before any advances were made, Cody 
communicated to Janice that he also understood that the money advanced to purchase a vehicle 
would have to be repaid. (Tr. I 1, Ln.1 7 - 12, Ln. 8, Plaintiffs Exhibit 2) 
Based on this understanding, Janice advanced money eight separate times to Cody 
starting on or about April of 2011 and continuing until March of 2012 in the total amount of 
I 
$17,628.36. (Tr.37, Ln.17, Plaintiff's Exhibit 21) The largest of the loans, $14,000.00, was 
made to Cody by wire transfer on or about April 6, 2011, for Cody to purchase a truck. (Id) In 
addition to other advances, Janice paid for insurance on the truck that Cody failed to pay as 
required by her agreement with him. (Tr.21, Ln.17 - 22, Ln.3) 
Cody was released from incarceration and worked at numerous jobs. (Tr.34, Ln.22 35, 
Ln.8) During the time he was released he made no payments to Janice, (Tr.34, Ln.9) and failed 
to maintain insurance on the truck. (Tr.21, Ln.17 - 22, Ln.3) Based on this, Janice requested 
that Cody sign over the title to the truck to her. (Tr.37 Ln.1, R.37-38) Cody refused, (R.22), and 
this lawsuit ensued. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court error when it found that Janice had intended to make a gift 
to Cody? 
B. Did the District Court error when it determined that any oral agreement between 
Cody and Janice was unenforceable based on the statute of frauds? 
C. Even if the oral agreement was subject to the statute of frauds, is it still enforceable 
based on the doctrine of part performance? 
D. Is Janice entitled to attorney's fees on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
No substantial competent evidence exists that Janice intended to make a gift to Codv 
because no reasonable person would relv solely upon Cody's testimony at trial that 
Janice intended to make a gift when that testimony was inconsistent with his prior 
statements that show he knew the money was a loan. 
Standard of Review 
A District Court's finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by 
substantial and competent, even if conflicting, evidence and they are not clearly erroneous. 
Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440,442,259 P.3d 586,588 (2011). Evidence is substantial 
and competent if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 
139 Idaho 322, 325, 78 P.3d 389, 392 (2003) citing In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 
Idaho 452, 19 P.3d 766 (2001). 
Appellate Courts give great deference to the factual finding of the District Court because, 
"[t]he trial court is better positioned than an appellate court to evaluate the demeanor, credibility, 
and testimony of the witnesses in weighing the evidence before it." "Traditionally, to foster 
reliable testimony the witness has been generally required to testify: (1) under oath or 
affirmation, (2) in the personal presence of the trier of fact so demeanor can be observed, and (3) 
subject to cross-examination." State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99, 102, 813 P.2d 910, 913 (Ct. 
App. 1991) citing the introductory comments to Article VIII of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Cody was not personally in the presence of the District Court when he testified in this 
matter because he testified by telephone from prison. (Tr.5, Ln.10) Because Cody was not 
personally in the presence of the District Court, the Court was unable to evaluate the demeanor 
of the witness and therefore the trial court's factual findings should not be entitled to as much 
deference as is normally accorded a District Com1. 
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It was clearly erroneous for the District Court to find that Janice intended to 
make a gift because the onlv evidence of Janice's donative intent came from Cody's 
trial testimony which was inconsistent with his prior statements. 
At trial, the only evidence that Janice intended to make a gift to Cody came from Cody's 
trial testimony. No other evidence of the gift is in the record. What is in the record are Cody's 
admissions that the advanced funds, including the money for the trnck, was to be paid back 
together with his acknowledgment of the paiiy's oral agreement. The District Court's finding 
that Janice intended to make a gift to Cody is clearly erroneous for the reason that it was not 
reasonable for the District Court to rely solely upon Cody's trial testimony to reach its 
conclusion in the face of his prior inconsistent statements. 
The elements of a gift are (1) a donor competent to contract; (2) freedom of will of the 
donor; (3) the gift must be complete and nothing left undone; (4) the property must be delivered 
by the donor and accepted by the donee; and (5) the gift must go into immediate and absolute 
effect. Matter of Lewis' Estate. 97 Idaho 299, 302, 543 P.2d 852, 855 (1975). "A necessary 
element of an enforceable gift, be it inter vivos or causa mortis, is present donative intent, that is 
the giver's purpose or motive to transfer immediately to the donee dominion over the object 
given." Christiansen v. Rumsey, 91 Idaho 684,686,429 P.2d 416,418 (1967). "Donative intent 
may be proven by direct evidence, including statements of donative intent, or inferences drawn 
from the surrounding circumstances, such as the relationship between the donor and donee." 
Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust 147 Idaho 117, 126,206 P.3d 
481,490 (2009). 
The District Court did not recite which burden of proof it applied in determining Cody 
proved the truck was a gift. The District Court only stated it found," ... compelling evidence that 
the monies transferred from Janice to Cody were a gift." (R.132) Although it has never been 
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clearly stated, it would appear that the burden of proof in Idaho to establish a gift is a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Admitting that there was no consideration for the deed and 
contending, as she does, that it conveyed the property to her as a 
gift inter vivos, the defendant, Phyllis Whyte, brings herself within 
the rnle that such gifts are not presumed and the burden is on the 
beneficiary to establish the gift. Lo Presti v. Manning, 125 
Cal.App. 442, 13 P.2d 1002; 38 C.J.S., Gifts,§ 65. 
"Where the donee stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship 
to the donor the burden is increased to the extent of requiring the 
beneficiary to establish the gift by clear and convincing evidence. 
Claunch v. Whyte. 73 Idaho 243, 
248, 249 P.2d 915, 917-18 (1952) 
Since there is no fiduciary relationship, then the burden of proof is a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Other than the fact that Janice is Cody's aunt, the only other evidence which would 
support a finding that Janice intended to give Cody the money to purchase a vehicle was Cody's 
trial testimony. Cody testified at trial: 
She even at one point specifically said, 'If down the road you can 
pay me back, fine; if you can't or don't want to, it doesn't matter 
because I have the money to help you out and want to help you 
out. That is what family is for. (Tr.44, Ln 11-15) 
While I was incarcerated at Orofino Institution in Idaho, plaintiff 
made it known to me, as well as the money being a gift to help me 
get back onto my feet because she was financially in a good 
position to do so, she wanted to volunteer to pay for the first full 
year of full coverage insurance as a gift to help me with insurance 
so I'd have one less bill to worry about while I was out there. 
(Tr.47, Ln. 20 Tr.48, Ln.1) 
It was known through conversations and letters that it was a gift. 
Unfortunately, as I am incarcerated right now and have been this 
entire time through the whole process of this complaint, I haven't 
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had any access to any of the personal letters that the plaintiff sent 
to me while I was incarcerated. They're not here. (Tr.48, Ln. 5-10) 
This is testimony was taken over the telephone and is not dependable or trustworthy. 
Furthermore, this lawsuit was filed February 11, 2013 (R.9), and went to trial on November 8, 
2013. (R.120) The point of the lawsuit was to collect money that had been lent to Cody by 
Janice. If Cody in fact had any kind of writing that evidenced this gift, he would have found a 
way to obtain it. Surely he could have arranged for it through his parents who were following 
the case as evidenced by their contact with the Court. (R.119) The only written evidence in this 
case is directly contradictory to Cody's trial testimony that he understood Janice to be making a 
gift. 
While Cody claims he thought Janice was making a gift, his understanding even before 
the time of the loan was that the money had to be paid back. On March 17, 2011, Cody 
understood the money was to be repaid. 
. . . i [sic] do want to emphasize that i hope you know your 
generosity and kindness is most definatl y [sic] appreciated!! i [ sic] 
never did get the impression from you [Janice] that this was 
something that was not to be paid back. ive [sic] assumed that it 
would the whole time, so no worries there, we are on the same 
page. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 2) 
The money to purchase a vehicle was transferred less than one month later on April 6, 2011. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 21) The record is devoid of anything indicating that between March 17th and 
April 6th Janice's intent changed from making a loan to making a gift. 
At trial, Cody attempted to explain away his written statement that the loan was to be 
repaid. "With no proof any money that was sent and without the plaintiffs side of the 
conversation, who is to say what I'm even referring to in the third line down where I write in the 
e-mail, 'I never did get the impression from you that this was something that was not be paid 
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back." (Tr.45, Ln25 - Tr. 46, Ln.4) However, the very next sentence clearly indicates he was 
referring to paying the money back used to purchase a truck, "as [sic] far as price goes I 
definitely understand that too. I was only looking at rigs in the ten thousand range ... " 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) 
Furthermore, Cody actually admitted that he and Janice had an oral agreement regarding 
the money Janice had lent to him. On May 31, 2012, Cody wrote Janice and asked for more 
money. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 19) On June I 0, 2012, Janice wrote back and declined to advance 
Cody any further money. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20) Janice then \\,Tote Cody on Wednesday, 
October 24th which requested Cody to sign over the title of the truck to her because he was not 
making payments to Janice and not maintaining vehicle insurance. (Tr.37, Ln.3, R.37) In 
response to Janice's request, Cody replied on November 3, 2012, that he was not willing to turn 
over the truck, but not because he believed it to be a gift. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 22) 
I spoke with my attorney about the matter, just for an opinion, not 
in regards to legalities FYI. She advised me that not only is my 
release dependant on having reliable insured transportation. But it 
is also accounted for in my P.S.R. (Pre-Sentence Report). My 
current and previous financial background is being thoroughly 
investigated and any large transaction over a certain $ amount can 
have possible negative connotations from the P.S.R. officer in 
regards to my sentencing recommendations. All relevant conduct 
it accounted for and scrutinized. With transportation & a job, both 
of which I have waiting for me, my attorney is confident she can 
get me released this month ... I am not going to stay locked up 
longer because I don't have my truck. I realize that you might be 
upset with me because of not being in the position to send you any 
money while I was out and also because of the scratch on the 
passenger side. Believe me when I say that both are equally if not 
more depressing to me as well! I don't like being in debt to 
anyone. 
Then later in that same letter from Cody to Janice. 
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The sooner I am out and working the sooner I can and will be 
sending you monthly payments. Perhaps we should put some ideas 
to paper in regards to a contract That way we have more 'in 
stone' understanding as to what is expected, opposed to our own 
understanding of the oral contract. 
These letters clearly show Cody knew the loaned money was not a gift and was expected to pay 
Janice back. Cody specifically addresses making payments, being in debt and having an oral 
contract between him and Janice. If, in fact, Cody actually thought the money was a gift, then 
that fact would have been the main topic of Cody's response. The money was not a gift; it was a 
gracious loan. At trial, Janice described the oral agreement between herself and Cody. 
And we had an oral agreement as far as the truck is concerned and 
the money that the truck was to have insurance on it at all times 
and Cody was to make a payment every month, be it small. But he 
was to make a payment every month and that if either one of those 
did not happen, that the truck was to be returned to me so ... (Tr.9, 
Ln 1-6) 
Janice's behavior was always consistent with this agreement. She has always required insurance 
on the truck and actually paid for it when Cody did not. In her first correspondence in the record 
where the truck is mentioned, Plaintiffs Exhibit 20, Janice expresses her concerns about the lack 
of insurance on the truck. 
I have asked you on several occasions about insurance on the 
truck. Each time you did not say with certainty if the truck is 
insured. So, having said that, I would ask that you provide me 
with the name and phone number of your agent. Or, you can send 
me a copy of your insurance card. I would prefer name and 
number. As I have said to you in numerous conversations the 
truck must have insurance. You cannot afford and I cannot afford 
for the truck to be uninsured. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 20, page 4) 
If Janice thought she had made a gift, she may have provided this advice anyway as having 
insurance is legally required and a good idea to protect your asset. However, she says that she 
wants insurance to protect her interest in the truck. Everything Janice did was consistent with an 
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understanding that she would be repaid or the truck would be turned over to her. Unfortunately, 
she did not think to note herself as a lien holder on the title and now Cody is taking advantage of 
that fact. 
The only evidence in this case that Janice intended to make a gift was Cody's testimony 
which the District Court was unable to watch him give. All the other evidence points to a 
finding that the parties had an oral agreement Cody would repay Janice as he could. The District 
Court's finding that Janice intended to gift the money to Cody is clearly erroneous because no 
reasonable person would have accepted Cody's testimony over all the other evidence in the case 
to the contrary. The District Court's finding of gift is not supported by substantial, competent 
evidence and should be vacated and the matter remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
The oral agreement is not within the statute of frauds because it was of an uncertain 
duration and could have been performed in a vear. 
The District Court held that even if an oral agreement between Janice and Cody existed, 
it was unenforceable based on Idaho Code §9-505(1) which provides that, "[a]n agreement that 
by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof," must be in writing. 
This was error because the contract was of uncertain duration and could have been performed in 
one (1) year. 
Oral contracts of uncertain duration are not subject to the statute of frauds set forth in J.C. 
9-505(1 ). "Contracts of uncertain duration are simply excluded, ... " Mackay v. Four Rivers 
Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 411, 179 P .3d I 064, 1067 (2008) citing Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts§ 130, Cmt a ( 1981 ). 
IO 
Janice described the oral agreement between herself and Cody. 
And we had an oral agreement as far as the truck is concerned and 
the money that the truck was to have insurance on it at all times 
and Cody was to make a payment every month, be it small. But he 
was to make a payment every month and that if either one of those 
did not happen, that the truck was to be returned to me so ... 1 
The agreement contained no time frame for the repayment of the loans. Idaho Code §9-
505(1) does not apply. 
The District Court ruled that the contract could not be performed within one (I) year 
because, 
Based on these facts, and upon Janice's knowledge of Cody's 
sporadic work history, the Court finds that it is not a reasonable 
interpretation of the alleged contract's terms to believe that Cody 
was required to fully perform the contract by both securing gainful 
employment and repaying the entire loan amount of $17,628.36 in 
the seven business days between Sunday, March 25, 2012, and 
Tuesday, April 3, 2012." (R.166) 
The District Court held that since Janice could not reasonably expect the money to be 
repaid within the year, then the duration of the contract is more than one (1) year. This is error 
because the expectations of the parties are not considered in determining if a contract can be 
performed within one (l) year, only the actual terms of the agreement and this agreement had no 
duration. 
1 Tr.9, In 1-4. 
A promise which is not likely to be performed within a year, and 
which in fact is not performed within a year, is not within the 
Statute, if at the time the contract is made there is a possibility in 
law and in fact that full performance such as the parties intended 
may be completed before the expiration of a year. Id. The question 
is not what the probable, or expected, or actual, performance of the 
contract was, but whether the contract, according to the reasonable 
interpretation of its terms, required that it could not be performed 
within the year. 
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Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing 
Co., 145Idaho408,411, 179P.3d 
1064, I 067 (2008) 
The contract here contained no duration so no term existed which reasonably could be 
interpreted to require that the contract could not be performed within one (I) year. This is why 
the contracts of uncertain duration are not subject to Idaho Code §9-505(1) there is no duration 
term to evaluate. While it may not have been reasonable for Janice to expect to be repaid and 
even though it was unlikely that Cody could repay the money within one (1) year, it still could 
have happened. 
The money was advanced to Cody from April 201 I to March 2012. Nothing would have 
prevented Cody from repaying the entire loan within one (1) year, however unlikely that might 
have been to occur given Cody's circumstances, so the agreement is not within the statute of 
frauds contained in Idaho Code §9-505(1). This Court should reverse the District Court's 
determination that the oral contract between Janice and Cody was unenforceable because it was 
subject to the statute of frauds. 
Even if the parties oral contract is subject to the statute of frauds, Janice paid and 
Cody accepted the monev which is part performance that would take the contract 
out of the statute of frauds. 
No dispute exists that Janice paid Cody money and Cody accepted that money. Janice 
did so based on Cody's oral promise that he would repay her when he could. It would be 
inequitable for Cody to escape his half of the bargain after Janice performed hers. 
The doctrine of part performance is an exception to the statute of frauds. 
The equitable principle by which a failure to comply with the 
statute of frauds is overcome by a party's execution, in reliance on 
an opposing party's oral promise, of an oral contract's 
requirements."); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statute of Frauds § 313 ("The basis 
of the doctrine of part performance is that it would be a fraud upon 
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the plaintiff if the defendant were permitted to escape performance 
of his or her part of the oral agreement after permitting the plaintiff 
to perform in reliance upon the agreement"). 
Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 
493,236 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2010) 
In this case, Cody orally agreed that he would pay Janice back when he could. Based on 
that promise, Janice advanced him money. It would be inequitable to allow Cody to keep the 
benefits of the very contract he seeks to invalidate based on the statute of frauds. 
If this Court detem1ines that the statute of frauds does apply, it should rule that the oral 
agreement is enforceable based on the doctrine of part performance. 
Freer is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on Appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
§12-120. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) provides for an award of attorney's fees where the amount 
pleaded is $35,000 or less. For the statute to apply, the amount plead must specifically state that 
it is below the statutory minimum. Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 734, 737, 874 P.2d 545, 548 
(I 994). The amount plead in this case is $17,628.36. (R.17) 
In addition, for the statute to apply, Janice was required to provide Cody notice of the 
claim at least ten (IO) days prior to filing it. "The obvious purpose ofI.C. §12-120(1) is to 
discourage litigation, since the statute requires the defendant to be notified of the plaintiffs claim 
against defendant for at least ten days before a complaint can even be filed." Cox v. Mueller, 
125 Idaho 734, 737, 874 P.2d 545, 548 (1994). 
On Wednesday, October 24th, presumably 20122, Janice demanded that Cody return the 
truck so she could sell it. 
2 The date states Wednesday, October 24, which calculates to be the year 2012. 
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I will need you to sign off on the title to the truck. I will need to 
sell I am so very sorry to have to write this. I saw the truck 
yesterday and I was quite surprised to see the scratches & damage. 
It was my understanding the truck was insured. For sure I know 
until the end of April. So, I don't know why you didn't file a claim 
and get it fixed. I am sure I will be able to sell it the way it is, but I 
may have to get it fixed. . .. I would ask that you have either your 
mom or dad bring it up to you and sign off . . . Then if you 
would just have them hang onto it until I can get the truck. 
Again, I am so very sorry about this. Perhaps I may be m a 
position to help you again when you are released. (R.37-38) 
Cody refused Janis' request and this suit ensued. 
I am so very sorry to say that I am not going to be able to sign over 
the title ... (Plaintiffs Exhibit 22) 
Janice is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120( 1 ). 
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CONCLUSION 
Janice Freer endeavored to assist her nephew to obtain employment when he was 
released from prison by, amongst other things, providing him funds to purchase a new trnck. All 
the evidence in this case indicates that Cody understood the funds were to be repaid, other than 
Cody's personal trial testimony. It is not reasonable to conclude that Janice intended to make a 
gift based solely on Cody's unsubstantiated trial testimony. Cody's trial testimony was 
inconsistent with his prior statements. It was clearly erroneous to find that Janice intended to 
make a gift to Cody. 
Janice and Cody had an oral agreement that Cody would repay Janice the money she was 
lending him. That oral agreement is not subject to the statute of frauds and even if it was, it is 
still enforceable because Janice partially performed the agreement by lending the money and 
Cody accepted it. It would be inequitable for Cody to avoid his obligation to repay the money 
after having received the benefit of it. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2014. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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